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A bridge over troubled water: A Structural Political Economy of vertical integration1 
Ivano Cardinale 
Goldsmiths, University of London 
 
In his classic 1973 article, Luigi Pasinetti formalised the algorithm of vertical integration. The 
algorithm (“logical process”) shows the link between representations of industrial 
interdependencies, originating in Quesnay’s Tableau économique and systematized by 
Leontief (1941, 1951), von Neumann (1945-6) and Sraffa (1960) among others, and vertically 
integrated representations such as those implicit in the classical theory of value, Keynesian 
macroeconomics and important strands of marginalist economics.2 
In industrial economies, production is carried out through interdependent processes. For 
example, agriculture produces corn, which is used in agriculture as seeds and in manufacturing 
for the subsistence of workers. Manufacture produces steel, which is used in manufacture to 
make steel and in agriculture in the form of ploughs. The fact that each industry provides inputs 
for other industries, and acquires the output of other industries as inputs, is what is referred to 
as industrial (or circular) interdependencies (CI henceforth).  
Vertical integration (VI henceforth) is the logical process whereby intermediate commodities 
are eliminated and attention is concentrated on primary inputs and final commodities. Corn is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The research leading to this article began with the presentation "The political economy of circular 
interdependencies and vertical integration: Opening the black box of 'national interest'" at the conference The 
Economics of Structural Change: A Conference in Honour of Luigi Pasinetti, 12-13 September 2012, Gonville 
and Caius College, Cambridge, and the SSRN working paper with the same title (Cardinale, 2012). 
2 The dualism between industrial interdependencies and vertically integrated representations provides a 
fundamental lens to interpret different traditions in economic analysis (see contributions in Baranzini and 
Scazzieri, 2012a (1st edn. 1990) and in particular Baranzini and Scazzieri 2012b, 2012c and Landesmann and 
Scazzieri, 2012; see also Scazzieri 1990, 1996). This paper’s focus on vertical integration does not mean to 
privilege vertically integrated representations over those based on industrial interdependencies, but rather to 
concentrate on the possibility to switch back and forth between the two representations, which was highlighted 
by Pasinetti’s (1973) formalization.  
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shown as being produced through an input of labour, which includes agricultural labour as well 
as the labour used to produce the steel used in agriculture—in other words, all the labour that 
is used across the economy to eventually produce corn. Something similar holds for means of 
production: corn is produced through a composite commodity, which includes all the 
commodities used across all industries to produce corn.  
As a result, vertical integration represents the system as a set of final commodities, each 
produced through an input of (composite) labour and an input of (composite) capital. Industrial 
interdependencies have disappeared. Or, rather, they have faded to the background, lurking 
implicit in the vertically integrated coefficients. Pasinetti has argued that this process opens up 
great possibilities for studying economic dynamics, as it allows preserving a multi-sectoral 
representation, which is essential for studying non-proportional dynamics, without carrying the 
analytical burden of inter-industry interdependencies. And, indeed, his work has systematically 
used vertical integration (Pasinetti, 1981, 1993).  
However, here I do not consider the implications of vertical integration for structural dynamics. 
Rather, I focus on the algorithm of vertical integration in itself—on its being a ‘bridge’ that 
allows us to go back and forth between representations of division of labour based on CI and 
VI. Crossing the bridge, I will argue, one has radically different vistas on production, 
distribution, and political conflicts. On each side, one sees different forms of conflict (between 
industries, sectors, classes) and different representations of collective objectives. Taking a 
further step, it is also worth reflecting on the bridge in itself—the fact that two formally 
equivalent representations highlight profoundly different views.  
This exploration requires revisiting widely held assumptions about economic cleavages and 
conflicts in society. Recall that in Quesnay’s (1972 [1759]) Tableau, ‘classes’ (which we could 
call industries in modern language) were economic activities as well as socio-political 
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aggregations. But the socio-political aspect of interdependencies was soon left on the 
background. Classical Political Economists and then Marx shifted the attention towards 
conflict between classes defined by income type (wage, profit, rent). The 20th-century 
‘rediscovery’ of industrial interdependencies (Leontief, 1941; von Neumann, 1945-6; Sraffa, 
1960), only focused on material and technological aspects; the socio-political dimension 
remained on the background.  
The Structural Political Economy approach (SPE), which informs this article, aims to 
‘complete’ the 20th-century rediscovery of industrial interdependencies. The idea is to use 
models of structural economic analysis, which provide alternative representations of division 
of labour, not only to study technological and material relations, but also to investigate possible 
socio-political aggregations that potentially carry economic interests (e.g. Cardinale 2012, 
2015, 2018b; Cardinale and Coffman 2014; Cardinale, Coffman and Scazzieri, 2017; Cardinale 
and Landesmann, 2017, Cardinale and Scazzieri, 2018). Here it is useful to refer to Truman’s 
(1951) distinction between actual and potential interest groups, where the latter potentially 
carry interests but do not necessarily organise themselves to influence policy-making. 
Accordingly, the aggregations suggested by structural representations—be they industries, 
classes, or VI sectors—can be seen as potential interest groups, which might benefit from 
specific policies and therefore might (or might not) organise themselves to influence policy.  
In the SPE approach, division of labour is seen as potentially guiding the formation of socio-
political aggregations within the economy and polity (see Cardinale, Coffman and Scazzieri, 
2017). However, in industrial economies division of labour is based on manifold 
interdependencies; hence, it cannot be seen as univocally determining socio-political 
aggregations. Rather, models of interdependencies can be seen as providing a set of 
aggregations that are possible within a given division of labour. For example, the ‘capitalists’ 
of a firm might conceive of themselves as belonging to an industry, thus seeing their interest 
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as aligned with other capitalists (and workers) therein against the interests of other industries. 
Alternatively, they might see themselves as allied with all capitalists, and in conflict with all 
workers, across industries. And so forth.  
It is well known that the social dimension of division of labour has been explored in sociology 
at least since Durkheim’s (1902) study of whether increasing division of labour is compatible 
with “social solidarity”, and the subsequent work of Ross (1938), Simmel (1955 [1922]) and 
Coser (1956) on the conditions under which conflicts between groups lead to social cohesion. 
In political science, similar themes have been addressed by research on political cleavages 
(Lijphart, 1968; Rae and Taylor, 1970) and on how industrial structure shapes countries’ 
political configuration (e.g. Ferguson, 1995; Ferguson et al., 2018). The SPE approach is 
compatible with these traditions. However, its explicit use of models of structural economic 
analysis has important advantages, because it makes it possible to explore the socio-political 
implications of different representations of division of labour (e.g. CI vs. VI) and of 
fundamental results in structural economic analysis (such as the VI algorithm and the viability 
conditions of different models). It thus becomes possible to gain new insights, such as the 
possibility that ‘systemic interest’ in the preservation of the system, which derives from 
productive interdependencies, lead to changes in actors’ particular interests and policy stances. 
 
1. Vertical integration and circular interdependencies: formally equivalent, substantively 
different 
1.1  Circular interdependencies (CI) 
Whilst the idea of interdependencies among aggregations that have both economic and socio-
political nature dates back at least to writers in the ‘political arithmetik’ tradition (e.g. 
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Davenant, 1698; Petty, 1663; King, 1696; see Coffman 2013; Cardinale and Coffman 2014), 
François Quesnay’s (1759 [1972]) Tableau économique arguably provided the first 
formalization of circular interdependencies, describing the circulation of commodities and 
money between industries that were seen as economic activities as well as socio-political 
aggregations. 20th-century models of industrial interdependencies (von Neumann, 1945; Sraffa, 
1960;  Leontief, 1941, 1951) can be seen as being directly inspired by Quesnay.  
But not all CI models are created equal. Take, for example, the representations adopted by 
Leontief and Sraffa.3 Equation (1) shows the price system of a Leontief open system.  
 
𝑝" … 𝑝$%" 1 − 𝑎"" ⋯ −𝑎",$%"⋮ ⋱ ⋮−𝑎$%"," ⋯ 1 − 𝑎$%",$%" = 𝑉" … 𝑉$%"  
(Adapted from Pasinetti, 1977: 61) 
Where pi are prices, aij are inter-industry coefficients, and Vi indicate the value added in each 
industry. For example, the value added of industry 1 equals the price of good 1 minus the prices 
of all the inputs (from 1 to n-1), weighed according to the proportion by which they are used 
in the production of good 1. Crucially, there is no determination of (no assumption about) how 
value added is distributed between types of income (Leontief, 1951; Pasinetti, 1977: 55, 61). 
Value added is basically an “all inclusive income” that will have to be divided between “wages, 
salaries, profit, and rents” (Pasinetti, 1977: 55).  
The price system of the Leontief open system is often thought to have no important practical 
application (see Pasinetti 1977: 73). But from a SPE perspective, there could be a crucial one. 
In fact, equation (1) induces us to see that each industry receives a value added Vi, which is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 To make notation uniform across the two models, I will follow the formulation provided by Pasinetti (1977). 
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then distributed among income types within the industry. Moreover, the equation shows the 
labour and capital employed in each industry. Since there are no conditions imposing that they 
be remunerated uniformly across industries, this model leaves open the possibility that 
remuneration differs.4 Hence, we are made aware of the possibility of conflict between 
industries (and, potentially, between classes within each industry). This is fully compatible 
with the analysis of Steenge and Van den Berg (2001). In fact, starting from Isnard’s (1781) 
reading and generalization of Quesnay’s Tableau, they show that, within a range compatible 
with the viability of the system, each combination of prices corresponds to a different 
distribution of surplus across industries. This has crucial implications from an SPE perspective, 
which will be discussed in the next section.  
Sraffa follows a different route. So long as the economy is stationary, there is no net product 
to be distributed and hence no need for assumptions about distribution. In fact, no such 
assumptions are made in Chapter 1 of Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities 
(Sraffa, 1960).  However, when turning to consider an economy with surplus, in Chapter 2, 
Sraffa immediately makes the assumption that the unitary wage and the rate of profit are 
uniform.  
𝑎""𝑝" + ⋯+ 𝑎$%","𝑝$%" 1 + 𝜋 + 𝑎$"𝑤 = 𝑝"⋮𝑎",$%"𝑝" + ⋯+ 𝑎$%",$%"𝑝$%" 1 + 𝜋 + 𝑎$,$%"𝑤 = 𝑝$%" 
(From Pasinetti, 1977: 73) 
In equation (2), we can see that the price of good 1 is made of the costs of inputs, remunerated 
at the rate of profit π, and the cost of labour, remunerated at wage w. In other words, surplus is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Steedman (2000) argues that Leontief ends up assuming homogenous labour, or at least exogenously given 
relative wage rates. What matters for our purposes is that the Leontief open system does not impose conditions 
whereby labour should be remunerated equally across industries (even if it was homogenous).	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divided between homogenous labour and capital. Crucially, we can see the labour employed in 
the corn industry and that employed in the steel industry. But since by assumption they are 
remunerated at the same rate (w), we are forced to see those inputs of labour as part of the same 
homogenous ‘pool’. The same holds for capital: we can see the capital used in each industry, 
but since it is remunerated at homogenous rate π, we are led to see it as a homogenous pool 
across industries. And this leads to conceive of labour and capital as socio-political 
aggregations. So the cleavage in society is inevitably between labour and capital, irrespective 
of the industries in which they are deployed. We see the industries, but we cannot see them as 
socio-political aggregations. 
Therefore, whilst the Leontief model leaves considerable freedom as to how value added is 
distributed across industries and types of income within them, in the Sraffa system we lose the 
possibility that value added is shifted across industries: conflict can only be between classes.5 
 
1.2  Vertically integrated sectors (VI) 
I have explained the intuitive meaning of vertical integration at the beginning of the article. In 
more formal terms, vertical integration can be expressed through a linear transformation of 
coefficients of use of intermediate commodities and labour into (i) a vertically integrated labour 
coefficient, which “expresses in a consolidated way the quantity of labour directly and 
indirectly required in the whole economic system to obtain one physical unit of [a given] 
commodity […] as a final good” (Pasinetti, 1973: 6); and (ii) a unit of vertically integrated 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The intellectual and socio-political context in which Leontief and Sraffa developed their models might help 
explain some of the differences discussed above. In fact, whilst both authors share a grounding in the theory of 
the circular flow (Leontief, 1991 [1928]; Sraffa, 1960), Leontief developed that approach for empirical purposes, 
whereas Sraffa was concerned with production prices in the Ricardian and Marxian traditions. However, this 
article aims to rationally reconstruct the representations’ implications for socio-political analysis, rather than 
analyse their origin. The latter would nonetheless be an interesting direction for further research. See also footnote 
8.    
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productive capacity, which “expresses in a consolidated way the series of heterogeneous 
physical quantities of commodities […], which are directly and indirectly required as stocks, 
in the whole economic system, in order to obtain one physical unit of [a given] commodity as 
a final good” (ibid.). As a result, each final commodity can be represented as the result of an 
input of a (consolidated) quantity of labour and a (consolidated) quantity of capital goods. For 
example, corn is produced by a consolidated input of labour across industries and a 
consolidated input of commodities (both corn and steel) across industries. 
Equation (3) shows how VI labour coefficients depend on CI coefficients. Something 
analogous holds for vertically integrated units of productive capacity.  
𝑣"⋮𝑣$%" = 1 − 𝑎"" ⋯ −𝑎",$%"⋮ ⋱ ⋮−𝑎$%"," ⋯ 1 − 𝑎$%",$%"
%" 3 𝑎$"⋮𝑎$,$%"  
(Adapted from Pasinetti, 1981: 112) 
 
Equation (3) shows that the labour required to produce good 1 is a weighted average of labour 
in (potentially) all industries. Whilst interdependencies between industries are presupposed, 
they are not visible. So we can see an input of labour entering the production of a series of 
commodities and a set of capital goods, variously owned and used across the economy, entering 
production of the same commodities. Vertically integrated sectors thus appear as ‘artificial’ 
constructions that do not point to any (prima-facie) obvious socio-political aggregation. For 
example, an industry such as agriculture is recognisable as a socio-political aggregation: it is 
obvious which workers are employed and which commodities are used within the industry, as 
well to what is produced (corn) and who buys it (other industries and final consumers). The 
vertically integrated sector that produces corn, in contrast, is an artificial construction of all the 
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labour and commodities used across the economy to produce the corn used by consumers. It 
will include a fraction of agricultural workers’ labour (the fraction that goes to final demand), 
a fraction of steel workers’ labour (the fraction that produces the steel that is then used in 
agriculture), etc. Something similar holds of capital inputs. Of course, it is difficult to assign a 
socio-political correlate to such construction. For example, which steel workers precisely work 
for the VI sector producing agricultural products?  
 
2. Vertical integration and circular interdependencies: a Structural Political Economy 
reading 
The algorithm of vertical integration allows us to cross the bridge between two representations 
of the economy that are formally equivalent, yet highlight different features of the economy. 
Let us now see what socio-political aggregations are suggested by each representation.  
2.1 CI representations: an SPE reading 
CI representations make it possible to visualise the multiplicity of industries as well as their 
interdependencies. Industries have been shown to often be relevant socio-political 
aggregations. For example, the relevance of industrial cleavages has been documented for 
political outcomes at the national level (Ferguson, 1995; Ferguson et al., 2018) as well as 
supranational policy-making (e.g. Coen 2007, Coen and Richards 2009) and especially for 
economic development (e.g. Furtado, 1967; Hirschman, 1968; Mamalakis, 1969; O’Donnell, 
1977). From an SPE perspective the explicit use of CI models for the purpose of understanding 
industrial interests has a further advantage: by showing the multiplicity of industries and their 
interdependencies, these models provide a heuristic to understand conflict as well as the limits 
within which it must be contained.  
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Let us start from the Leontief open system. Two interpretations are possible. One, referring to 
the price system, is about conflicts on prices, which lead to changes in value added across 
industries. Following Steenge and Van den Berg’s (2001) reading of Isnard’s generalization of 
the Tableau, one can envision that, within a range of prices compatible with viability of the 
economy, there could be a conflict over policies leading to changes in prices, corresponding to 
different distributions of value added across industries. Crucially, prices must remain within a 
certain range, outside which the distribution of value added would make some industries unable 
to continue production, thus making the whole system unviable. 
The other interpretation, referring to the quantity system, is suggested by the “Hawkins-Simon 
conditions” for viability (Hawkins and Simon 1949; see also Nikaido 2014; Duchin and 
Steenge 2007; Steenge 2011). The conditions concern the technology matrix; if they are met, 
the system can reproduce itself (i.e. reintegrate the means of production utilised at the 
beginning of the production process) and produce a surplus under a variety of sectoral 
proportions.  
Whilst the two interpretations above might highlight different forms of conflicts and 
constraints, for example on prices or quantities, they both point to the possibility of conflict 
between industries: within a range of proportions given by technology, an industry can expand 
relative to others without making the system unviable. The existence of a range is crucial: if 
only one proportion were compatible with viability, any deviation would jeopardize the system 
and hence conflict would not be possible.  
The model thus highlights the multiplicity of industries and the possibility of conflict between 
them. In addition, it makes it possible to see labour and capital not as homogenous pools, but 
as differentiated across industries. In other words, labour and capital in each industry can be 
seen as separate socio-political aggregations. In fact, Leontief’s lack of assumptions about 
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distribution of value added leaves room to conceive that workers and capitalists within a sector 
be allied, if we allow for different remuneration in each sector (i.e. if we do not assume 
uniformity of wage and profit across industries). Alternatively, workers and capitalists within 
an industry might be allied against other industries, but also in conflict within the industry. In 
sum, this models suggests a conflict between industries (and, potentially, between classes 
within each industry).  
This analysis suggests that value added can be taken as an indication of industrial interests, 
just in the same way as wage or profit are often taken as indications of class interests. And if 
a sector is able to retain a higher value added, then all categories of income within that sector 
might benefit from it, at least in principle. Therefore, the problem here is the formation of value 
added in an industry instead of another—as opposed to distribution of a given social product 
between (homogenous) classes. Industrial proportions are thus not just a technical matter, but 
can themselves be the object of political conflict.  
However, there is a key constraint to the pursuit of an industry’s particular interest. Whilst 
industrial interdependencies allow for conflict between industries, they also require that the 
system be kept within proportions compatible with viability, thus imposing limits on conflict. 
We can interpret this as a systemic interest in the viability of the system, which balances or 
limits particular interests (Cardinale 2015, 2017, 2018a). Keeping the system viable is a 
necessary condition for each industry’s pursuit of its own interest—it does not (necessarily) 
reflect a “normative” commitment to some definition of collective interest (see Cardinale and 
Coffman, 2014, on the importance of this approach to understand the sustainability of taxation 
in eighteenth-century Britain). In other words, the political strategy of each industry must 
reconcile its particular interest with systemic interest. Models of industrial interdependencies 
thus allow for conflict but also impose limits on it.  
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The concept of systemic interest can help shed new light on trade-offs between collective 
interests and particular interests. Take, for example, List’s (1996 [1827], p. 87) remark that 
"[canals] and railroads may do great good to a nation, but all waggoners will complain of this 
improvement. Every new invention has some inconvenience for a number of individuals, and 
is nevertheless a public blessing”. Or take Kuznets’ (1971) idea that economic development 
requires the state to resolve conflicts among interest groups, but it also needs a ‘feeling of 
community’ that leads interest groups to sacrifice their particular interests. In both cases, there 
is a trade-off between particular interests and collective interest, but little indication about how 
it can be studied.  
Systemic interest can help analyse such trade-offs—and it has interesting properties. First, 
unlike ‘national interest’, it is not tied to the national level; it can express an interest in the 
preservation of any system of interdependencies, including for example regional or 
supranational ones (Cardinale, 2017). Second, systemic interest does not (typically) dictate a 
specific policy. On the contrary, it specifies a range of proportions: it is a constraint on possible 
outcomes, and is therefore (in principle) compatible with a plurality of policies.   
Because systemic interest derives from interdependencies, models that do not take them into 
account (see Rogowski 1987; Persson and Tabellini 2002) are typically unable to specify 
potential limits to each industry’s pursuit of its own interest. Yet systemic interest can be of 
great relevance for understanding industries’ interest formation and policy stances, as shown 
for example by Cardinale and Landesmann (2017) with reference to tradable and non-tradable 
industries in the Eurozone and their conflict around policies affecting the real exchange rate. 
More broadly, the interplay of particular and systemic interests could help analyse a range of 
empirical problems characterized by the need to understand the formation of interests as well 
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as potential changes in policy stances that result from threats to the viability of the system.6 
The interplay of particular and systemic interests could also be explored through models that 
have extended Leontief’s CI approach to new theoretical and empirical problems. For example, 
CI approaches can be enhanced to take into account scarcity (e.g. Quadrio Curzio, 2009; 
Steenge, 2015; see also Duchin, 2015).7 Moreover, new databases have been developed on CI 
foundations to address emerging economic problems. For example, the World Input-Output 
Database (WIOD) was developed to account for the increasing fragmentation of production 
across countries and its effects on productivity and trade (Timmer et al., 2015), whilst the 
Exiobase database was created to study the environmental impact of production and 
consumption (Tukker et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2015).8  
The foregoing argument was developed with reference to the Leontief open system (and 
extensions thereof). However, not all CI representations are equally conducive to the 
visualization of industrial conflicts (and systemic interests). For example, in the Sraffa system 
industries are visible, so that inter-industry conflicts could be visible too, at least in principle. 
However, the assumptions of uniformity of wage and profit shift attention from conflict 
between industries to conflict between classes: whilst the contributions of labour to each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 This approach may be especially relevant in the case of fragile ecosystems whose preservation is likely to be an 
important element of systemic interest. For example, the literature on sustainable fisheries that combines input-
output and ecological models (e.g. Jin, Hoagland and Dalton, 2003; Bhat and Bhatta, 2006) has estimated effects 
of different types of regulation (e.g. open-access harvesting vs. access restrictions) on different segments of the 
industry and on other industries (Bhat and Bhatta 2006). An SPE analysis of such results might explore particular 
interests towards different forms of regulation (e.g. cleavages depending on the techniques adopted by different 
firms within the industry) as well as the systemic interests in keeping the ecosystem viable, on the part of different 
segments of the industry and other industries (see e.g. Jin et al.’s (2013) estimated costs of habitat destruction for 
the economy as a whole). These considerations about balancing particular and systemic interests can also be 
important for analyzing the EU Common Fisheries Policy (see Carpi et al., 2017) and informing further 
developments thereof. 
7 The interplay of scarcities and rents in structural dynamics has been studied extensively by Quadrio Curzio 
(1967, 1986, 2009; see also Quadrio Curzio and Pellizzari, 1999, 2018) by combining CI and VI features. That 
line of research might therefore prove particularly suitable for an SPE analysis along the lines pursued in this 
paper (see also Cardinale, 2015; Scazzieri, Baranzini and Rotondi, 2015). 
8 A different perspective, not taken in this paper but worthy of further investigation, would be to consider how the 
development of the initial CI models was influenced by the perception of specific economic problems, and 
similarly how more recent models might reflect new perceived problems. See also footnote 5. 
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industry is visible, it is remunerated at the same rate across industries, so that it appears as a 
uniform block in the economy. This is reinforced by the well-known result that, in the standard 
system, distribution can be seen as independent of prices and displays a trade-off between profit 
and wage, which leads to taking division of labour (the system of interdependencies) as a 
simply technical (not political) factor. In other words, the formation of surplus is a technical 
matter; the political aspect only lies in the distribution of a given surplus between classes.  
 
2.2 VI representations: an SPE reading 
Whilst industries, as highlighted by CI models, have been shown to often correspond to 
significant socio-political aggregations, it is not obvious whether the same holds for VI sectors. 
In fact, VI sectors are combinations of industries that are broken down and recomposed 
according to a logical criterion that hardly corresponds, at least prima facie, to any socio-
political aggregation. In Truman’s (1951) terms, one can conjecture that it would be difficult 
for such ‘potential’ interest groups to organise themselves into ‘actual’ interest groups. What 
kind of socio-political aggregations does VI suggest? This is of course open to interpretation, 
but three possibilities seem particularly relevant.9  
The first is the economic system as a whole. In fact, because VI coefficients are linear 
combinations of inter-industry coefficients, every final commodity is obtained going through 
stages of production that involve many industries. This amounts to the view that the economy 
as a whole produces a set of final commodities. In fact, the contribution of individual industries 
is not visible: the whole system produces final commodities. In other words, whilst a VI 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The analysis below follows Pasinetti’s (1981) vertically integrated model; the resulting socio-political 
aggregations and conflicts obviously depend on this choice. It is likely that an SPE analysis of other vertically 
integrated models, or of models combining CI and VI features, would suggest different aggregations and potential 
conflicts (e.g. Quadrio Curzio, 1967, 1986; Lowe, 1976; Amendola and Gaffard, 1988; Hagemann, 1990; 
Cardinale and Scazzieri, 2016; Bianchi and Labory, 2018; Landesmann, 2018).  
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representation is a disaggregated one, in the sense that output is broken down into different 
commodities, it is a highly artificial (i.e., abstract) disaggregation. The emphasis is thus on the 
cooperative, systemic aspect of production. For example, the Pasinetti version emphasizes the 
macroeconomic dimension. In fact, in the absence of (explicit) industrial interdependencies, 
what makes the system more than a collection of vertically integrated sectors is the 
macroeconomic condition. It is therefore not surprising that, in this approach, a crucial 
collective objective is full employment. For example, for Pasinetti (1981, p. 91), an ‘Agency’ 
might be entrusted with targeting full employment, which is likely to be a moving target 
because of changes in technology and demand. Of course, adopting the whole economy as a 
socio-political aggregation raises the problem of how the systemic objective is formed. Full 
employment is only one possible objective; an economy could rather pursue maximum growth, 
or yet another objective. Hence, in this case political conflict could be conceived of in terms of 
how the systemic objective is determined.  
The second socio-political aggregation might be VI sectors themselves. It was noted above that 
sectors do not seem to correspond, at least prima facie, to obvious socio-political aggregations. 
However, imagine a case of significant within-industry heterogeneity, such as when some parts 
of an industry belong to the VI sector of tradable goods whereas other parts contribute to the 
VI sector of non-tradable goods (see Cardinale and Landesmann, 2017). In such a case, the 
relevant cleavage might be between VI sectors rather than industries, and the formation of 
economic interests and policy stances might be shaped accordingly. The possibility of conflicts 
between VI sectors seems compatible with Pasinetti’s model under the assumption of the 
possibility of different sectoral profit rates.  
The third possibility for aggregation is along the lines of wage and profit (which in Pasinetti’s 
model do not necessarily correspond to workers and capitalists, given the assumption that 
workers can save). In this case, we need to distinguish between the hypothesis of differentiated 
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profit rates and the ‘competitive’ situation, in which the profit rate is relatively uniform across 
sectors. In the former case, the model can suggest the coexistence of cleavages between wages 
and profit and between different VI sectors. In the latter, ‘competitive’ case, the only conflict 
is between wage and profit. It is interesting to note the similarities and differences vis-à-vis CI 
analysis. As in the passage from Leontief to Sraffa, the conflict becomes between wage and 
profit as soon as the assumption of uniform rates is made. But whereas Sraffa constructs a 
wage-profit frontier, Pasinetti’s analysis finds that only a specific rate of profit leads to full 
employment and full capacity utilization: other rates are suboptimal.  
 
2.3 Comparing the political economy of VI and CI 
Let us bring the argument together. In CI representations, conflict can be between industries 
(Leontief approach)—which leaves open the possibility of conflict between classes within each 
industry—or classes (Sraffa approach). Moreover, in the former case (Leontief) viability can 
be seen as an explicitly ‘political’ problem, in that it requires specific constraints on the choices 
concerning proportions between industries. Viability thus constitutes a form of systemic 
interest, to be understood as a constraint imposed on the pursuit of particular (industrial) 
interests. In the latter case (Sraffa), viability is a purely ‘technical’ problem—and one that is 
assumed at the outset—so that the political dimension boils down to distribution of surplus 
between classes. 
In VI representations, conflict can be between VI sectors or classes, or both, depending on the 
‘institutional’ features of the economy and polity in question. Systemic interest takes a different 
form. Recall that, in CI models, viability is a criterion that can be satisfied by a plurality of 
proportions, leaving open the possibility of conflicts between industries; as such, it is a 
constraint on the pursuit of particular interests, not an objective in itself. The full employment 
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criterion of VI models—at least under ‘competitive’ conditions—is only compatible with one 
equilibrium profit rate: other rates are suboptimal, in that they lead to unemployment. Hence, 
whilst in CI models the political strategy of each industry has to make sure that proportions do 
not violate viability conditions, in VI models unemployment (in and of itself) does not 
jeopardize the system. Hence, whilst it can be seen as a collective objective, it is not necessarily 
a constraint on the pursuit of particular interests on the part of sectors or classes. 
 
3. LOOKING AHEAD: STRUCTURES, REPRESENTATIONS, AND INTERESTS 
So far we have discussed, so to speak, the vistas from each side of the bridge. We can now turn 
to the bridge itself—the formal equivalence between CI and VI representations.   
The foregoing analysis has investigated the socio-political aggregations suggested by different 
representations of division of labour. However, it leaves open the problem of which 
representations, out of the many that are possible in a given situation, will be adopted by 
economic actors—industries, sectors, segments of labour and capital within each industry, 
etc.—as a guide to the formation of their interests, which in turn informs their political action, 
and hence economic policies and systemic outcomes. This is an important problem in political 
science (Blyth, 2003), and it may be argued to be relevant for structural economic analysis as 
well (Cardinale, 2018b; Cardinale and Scazzieri, 2018; Scazzieri, 2018). 
According to Blyth, the extreme positions concerning how political actors form their own 
interests are structural determination and ‘ideational’ construction. According to the former, 
actors’ positions within economic structure univocally determine their interests. According to 
the latter, formation of interests depends on ‘ideas’ that are largely independent of economic 
structures. It can be shown that many routes to reconcile economic structures with ‘ideas’ have 
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significant shortcomings (Cardinale, 2018b). However, for the current purposes it is important 
to focus on how the VI algorithm, as interpreted in this article, shows crucial limitations of 
both of the aforementioned extreme positions—structural determination and ideational 
construction. In fact, the VI algorithm shows that the same economy can be represented through 
models that highlight different socio-political aggregations and economic interests. Hence, 
interests cannot be conceived of as being univocally determined by economic structure. But 
this does not amount to claiming that interests can simply be formed in a way that is 
independent of economic structures. In fact, some constructions of interests might not be 
compatible with existing structures; they might therefore lead to ignoring viability conditions 
and prove unsustainable.10  
At this stage of the argument, it seems necessary to prevent a possible objection. In fact, one 
might argue that the foregoing analysis suggests that a variety of representations of interests is 
possible even remaining within a CI or VI representation; in other words, the VI algorithm 
might not seem to be necessary for us to obtain the result of lack of univocal determination. In 
this regard, we must note that the VI algorithm makes it possible to move between alternative 
representations of the same productive system. In other words, it shows that the same 
productive system cannot be represented univocally; hence, it cannot univocally determine 
economic interests. This is different from the shift between different cleavages within the same 
representation of division of labour (e.g. from Leontief to Sraffa), deriving from different 
assumptions about homogeneity of remuneration of labour or capital. In fact, the VI algorithm 
entails a shift between representations of division of labour, whilst the shift (so to speak) from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This argument can also have implications for the political science literature on cleavages, since it might lead to 
formation of conflicts along different lines at the same time. In fact, the same industry might be allied with some 
industries for a given policy issue and with others for different issues. Similarly, different segments of labour and 
capital might be allied in some situations but be in conflict in others. The fact that the same structure could be 
represented in different ways further complicates the picture, because actors might adopt different representations 
of particular and systemic interests. In further research, it would be interesting to study under what conditions 
such cleavages would foster or hinder the recognition and pursuit of systemic interests.  
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Leontief to Sraffa takes place within a given representation of division of labour. And whilst it 
is true that both shifts can give rise to different socio-political aggregations and economic 
interests, they do so 'at different levels', so to speak. We might say that the former is at a 
fundamental level—that of division of labour: it concerns the representation of the technical 
and material aspect of production. The latter is more 'institutional', having to do with 
assumptions about remuneration of factors of production within a given structure of division 
of labour. 
Therefore, one might say that univocal determination of interests is impossible even within a 
given representation of division of labour (say, within the CI scheme). But the VI algorithm 
leads to a more radical result: even the structure of division of labour cannot be taken as given: 
not even the 'objective' structure of interdependencies can be represented univocally. And this 
is coherent with the fundamental idea of SPE: the socio-political analysis of the economy does 
not only concern distribution of a given surplus, but also lies in the very technical and material 
arrangements expressed by division of labour.  
The foregoing argument may appear to provide a ‘negative’ result—that economic structure 
cannot univocally determine actors’ representation of the structures within which they act, and 
hence of the socio-political aggregation to which they belong and their economic interests. 
However, this result may prove to be a highly generative one for structural economic analysis. 
Two fundamental directions can be singled out.  
One can be seen as a contribution to the empirical analysis of the formation of interests that are 
made possible by economic structures in a given situation. Structural analysis can help 
appreciate that observed interests, such as those reconstructed by political science analyses 
(e.g. Ferguson, 1995; Ferguson et al., 2018), are not the only possible ones. For example, in a 
given situation one might observe alliances formed along industry lines, but SPE suggests that 
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alliances could also be informed by VI sectors. Moreover, workers might make coalitions with 
other workers across industries or with ‘capitalists’ in the same industry. The systemic 
objective could be full employment, maximum growth, or yet another—or a combination 
thereof. Each representation will highlight different particular interests as well as constraints 
(systemic interest). Visualizing a variety of possibilities can help political actors (i.e. socio-
political aggregations) become aware of alternatives and potentially identify forms of systemic 
interest that would not otherwise be apparent. For example, if actors adopt a VI representation, 
which assumes viability at the outset, they might overlook the need to keep the system within 
proportions compatible with viability.  
The other direction involves understanding why, in a given context, actors settle on certain 
representations of interests out of the many that are possible. This direction requires that the 
theoretical scope of structural economic analysis be expanded. In fact, it can be argued that 
structural analysis studies the complex constraints that division of labour imposes on the pursuit 
of a variety of objectives (individual, industrial or sectoral, systemic, …) within the economy 
and polity (Cardinale and Scazzieri, 2018). However, moving from possibilities (what division 
of labour makes possible) to propensities (what possibilities are more likely in a given context) 
requires understanding how actors make decisions within structures. Structural analysis lacks 
such a theory; hence, it is typically not equipped to move from possible outcomes to actual 
outcomes—except by assuming simple behavioural rules. This article exposes this problem: 
because economic structures cannot univocally determine representations adopted by actors, 
understanding the formation of interests requires understanding what representations are 
adopted in any given context. This is a necessary direction if structural analysis aspires to 
understand the socio-political aspect of economic structure. This direction could be pursued by 
developing a theory of action within economic structures, perhaps also drawing on building 
blocks from work that has addressed the problem in different theoretical contexts (Bourdieu, 
	   21 
1990; Sewell, 1992; Emirbayer and Mische, 1997, Cardinale 2018a; see also Cardinale 2018b), 
as well as opening up to historical and empirical studies that can help understand the contextual 
conditions that make some visualisations, decisions and outcomes more likely than others. 
  
4. CONCLUSION 
This article’s argument was organised around the metaphor of the algorithm of vertical 
integration as a bridge between two vistas. The aim was to provide an SPE reading of CI and 
VI, showing the different views on cleavages and economic interests associated with them. The 
structure of division of labour (industrial interdependencies and VI sectors) was used as a 
blueprint for socio-political aggregations, showing that conflicts must not necessarily (or 
exclusively) be conceived of in terms of “class” analysis; division of labour is therefore not 
just a technical issue, but is itself a “political” one, in that it is invested with interests and is the 
object of conflicts. 
But the two vistas aren’t all that matters. The “bridge” is significant in itself, for the algorithm 
of vertical integration shows the formal equivalence between two representations leading to 
different socio-political aggregations, cleavages and visualisations of systemic interests. This 
formal equivalence suggests the impossibility of univocal structural determination of economic 
interests. It thus calls for opening up the range of conflicts and systemic interests that are 
possible in a given situation, over and above those actually perceived by actors. Symmetrically, 
the article calls for structural analysis to address how to move from possible representations to 
those that are more likely in a given situation—and this requires extending the theoretical 
corpus of structural analysis to study action within structures (Cardinale 2018b; Cardinale and 
Scazzieri, 2018). 
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Seen in this light, the algorithm of vertical integration seems to go much beyond what Pasinetti 
(1973) originally envisioned. Appreciating these ramifications requires paying renewed 
attention to the socio-political dimension of the structure of division of labour—a layer that is 
connected, but not reducible, to the material dimension emphasized by the 20th-century revival 
of structural analysis.  
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